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Labor Market Reforms on the Unemployment Rate  
and Wage Payments in Europe  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In contrast to the existing literature that focuses only on high unemployment driven by 
labor market regulations, this study emphasizes the impact of labor market regulations on 
wage payments in 15 European countries over the period 1985 to 2009. Through a 
simultaneous system of labor demand and supply, we find that the effect of labor market 
institutions on the behavior of labor demand outweighs the effect on labor suppliers, which 
pushes up the wage rate and mitigates the unemployment problem. By detailed investigations 
into all the responses of players in the labor market, it is plausible for policymakers in Europe 
to figure out the most efficient method for lowering the unemployment rate without hurting 
wage payments or discouraging labor supply. 
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1 Introduction 
Labor market regulations (hereafter LMR) have long been blamed in the literature for 
the unemployment problem in Europe (for example, see Nickell, 1997, 1998, and 2003; 
Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell et al., 2005; among many others). The criticism on 
strict LMR has led to comprehensive reforms on labor market institutions (Siebert, 1997; 
Saint-Paul, 2004). This study focuses on the unemployment driven by LMR in Europe as has 
been emphasized in the existing literature and addresses the impact of LMR on wage 
payments. In contrast to the existing literature that solely estimates the reduced-form equation 
model of the unemployment rate, this research sets up a simultaneous system of labor 
demand and supply and employs the two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) methodology for 
empirical analysis. Revealing information on the different responses from all market players 
involved, the simultaneous equation models facilitate our investigation on the price (wage 
rate) and quantity (unemployment) effects caused by the LMR reforms.  
We employ data from 15 European countries, spanning from 1985 to 2009 for the study,1
 
 
and find that various LMR reforms have different impacts on the market players, such that 
the overall effect of LMR hinges primarily on how the labor market institutions alter the 
decisions of all the labor market players. On the one hand, decreases in union density, 
replacement rate, and tax wedge significantly discourage labor supply, because the loose 
labor market regulations undermine work security and hence discourage labor market 
participation. On the other hand, de-unionization and tax system reforms seem to play the 
most significant role in enhancing labor demand. Overall, along with the LMR reforms 
toward improved flexibility, the job growth effect in Europe outweighs the decreases in labor 
supply, accounting for the observed unemployment rate reduction and wage payment 
increases. One important implication of the above findings is that some reforms might cancel 
out the effect of labor market reforms on demand and supply, such as de-unionization. As a 
consequence, via detailed investigations on all the responses of players in the labor market, it 
is plausible for policymakers in Europe to figure out the kind of labor market reforms that 
could simultaneously alleviate the unemployment problem and increase wage payments 
without discouraging much of the labor supply.  
2 Background 
Labor market institutions refer to the regulations set by governments so as to provide an 
enhanced secure working environment, which is particularly important for unskilled, 
low-wage workers with less bargaining power. Labor market regulations mainly include 
unemployment insurance, employment protection legislation, tax wedge (i.e., the gap 
between earnings and take-home pay, including social insurance expenses), and unionization. 
The regulations can turn into so-called “labor market rigidities” when they are enacted 
according to an overly-high standard (e.g., Siebert, 1997; Nickell, 1997, 1998, and 2003; 
Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell et al., 2005; Saint-Paul, 2004). Taking abundant 
unemployment insurance as an example, a longer duration of an unemployment benefit 
entitlement might lead to work disincentives for the unemployed (Nickell, 1997, 1998, and 
2003; Blanchard, 2000; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002; Nickell et al., 2005) and hence shift 
the labor supply curve leftward. At the same time, improved working standards imply higher 
labor costs, plausibly discouraging employers from creating additional new jobs (Nickell, 
1997; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).  
Labor market institutions have been blamed for the high unemployment rate in Europe 
(Nickell, 1997 and 1998; Nickell et al., 2005; Romero-Avila and Usabiaga, 2009), and 
criticism of them has led to the adoption of labor market reforms since the mid-1980s and 
early 1990s (Siebert, 1997; Saint-Paul, 2004). For example, the Netherlands increased stricter 
unemployment benefit administration and provided better coordination in wage setting in the 
                                                 
1 The 15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. 
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1990s. In the same era, the United Kingdom government implemented a stricter benefit 
administration, reduced much of union coverage, and lowered union density and labor taxes 
(Siebert, 1997; Nickell, 2003).  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of LMR measures in Europe. The figure presents the 
average union density, employment protection, replacement rate, and tax wedge over the 15 
countries since 1985. At first glance, aside from the replacement rate, the other three LMR 
measures decline over time, reflecting the well-known mitigation of labor market regulation 
addressed above. The replacement rate demonstrates a very different tendency from the other 
three, increasing over time until 2000.  
     
 
Figure 1. Measurements for labor market regulations, 1985-2009 
 
 
 
3 Model Set-up and Methodology 
We include LMR into the labor supply sL  and demand dL  functions and then map 
out their relationship with wage growth and unemployment rate in equilibrium as follows:  
Labor supply function: ) , ; ( FertilityLMRwg
L
Ls
= ,  (1) 
   Labor demand function: ),;( Ω= LMRwf
L
Ld ,   (2) 
where L  and w  represent total labor force and hourly wage rate, respectively, with LMR 
as the labor market regulation vectors that include the four measures in Figure 1, i.e., union 
density (Union ), employment protection ( EPL ), replacement rate ( RR ), and tax wedge 
(TAX ). The LMR variables measure the degree of labor market regulation with higher values 
representing more rigorous labor market. The fertility rate ( Fertility ) is the supply shift 
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variable, altering the supply preference (e.g. Kogel, 2004)2 Ω, and  represents the vector of 
aggregate demand shocks. Based on the related literature and the available data for the 15 
countries, Ω  contains the GDP growth rate (GR), changes in labor productivity 
(Productivity), and technological shocks measured by research and development expenditure 
(RD) and total factor productivity (TFP) (e.g., Berman et al., 1998; Bartel and Sicherman 
1999; Acemoglu 2002). 
We define the unemployment rate as ≡u
L
L
−1 , where L is the employment rate in 
equilibrium. Combined with the definition of the unemployment rate, we rewrite the supply 
and demand functions in equilibrium as follows:   
                 .1),;( uFertilityLMRwg
L
L
−==  
This yields a transformed labor supply function as a function of the wage rate: 
( 'sL ): ),;(1 FertilityLMRuGw −=  .                      (1)’ 
Similarly, the transformed labor demand function becomes an unemployment equation:  
              ( 'dL ): ),; (1 Ω= − LMRwHu  .                           (2)’   
Because the wage rate and unemployment rate are endogenous in the simultaneous 
model, the ordinary least squares estimators are inconsistent. We employ the 
two-stage-least-squares methodology (2SLS) for empirical analysis. The first stage estimates 
the reduced-form equations, which give the effects from changes in all the exogenous 
variables on the two endogenous variables (i.e., wage rate and unemployment rate). Again, 
the reduced-form estimations are common in the existing literature where either the wage or 
unemployment equation is estimated alone by a single regression equation. In the 
second-stage estimation, the so-called structural-form estimation, we replace the two 
endogenous explanatory variables by the two-fitted variables obtained in the first stage. The 
structural-form estimation facilitates the marginal effect analysis of all the variables, 
including the endogenous explanatory variables and the exogenous variables on the decisions 
of all labor market participants from both the supply and demand sides. 
Our empirical set-ups for the wage payment and unemployment equations in the 
two-stage regression for the panel dataset are as follows:  
ittiitititit
itititititit
tyProductiviGRTFPRD
FertilityTaxRREPLUnionw
,19876
54321
          ενµαααα
ααααα
+++++++
++++=
First-stage estimation (reduced-form equations): 
 
(3) 
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Labor supply 
Second-stage estimation (structural-form equations): 
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ititititititit FertilityTaxRREPLUnionuw
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(5) 
Labor demand 
ittiitit
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+++++
++++++=
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2 In OECD countries, the negative relationship between the total fertility rate and female employment is 
commonly observed (see for example, Kogel (2004)).  
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Here, itw  and itu  denote the wage rate and unemployment rate for country i at time t. 
Variables jµ , iω , iκ , and iθ  represent time-invariant individual effects, and tν , tη , tϕ , 
and tπ  are time effects, typically presented by a time dummy, capturing the unknown supply 
and demand shocks. The reduced-form estimations, Equations (3) and (4), consist of all the 
exogenous variables shown in the simultaneous system of Equations (1)’ and (2)’. The two 
fitted variables, wˆ  and uˆ , obtained in the first-stage estimation, replace the two 
corresponding endogenous explanatory variables in the second-stage estimation. We 
summarize the remaining notations and definitions below, and Table A1 in the appendix 
presents variable definitions and data sources along with the basic statistics. 
EPL:  Employment protection legislation, a scale variable ranging from 0 to 6, 
with 6 being the most protected level. 
RR:   Replacement rate, calculated by the amount of unemployment insurance, 
divided by the former wages of unemployed workers (%). 
TAX:  Tax wedge, representing the gap between earnings and take-home earnings 
(%). 
Union: Union density (%). 
Fertility: Fertility rate (births per woman). 
RD:   Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP). 
TFP:  Total factor productivity growth rate (%). 
    GR:   GDP growth rate (%). 
Productivity: Labor productivity growth rate (%). 
For the expected signs of the coefficient presented in the structural form of the supply 
equation, mitigating LMR might decrease the labor supply if workers feel insecure in a worse 
working environment, which leads to a higher wage rate. Restrictions on firing could cause 
higher participation rates if unproductive workers, who would otherwise exit the labor force, 
are restrained in jobs (e.g., Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002). Thus, the expected signs of the 
coefficient estimates of variables measuring LMR are negative, i.e., 2γ , 3γ , 4γ , and 5γ <0. 
The negative relationship between female employment and the fertility rate leads to a positive 
of 6γ  (e.g., Kogel 2004). The expected signs of the coefficient estimates of LMR variables 
in the demand equation are positive, because additional regulations mean higher labor cost, 
weaker labor demand, and a higher unemployment rate. Thus, 2δ , 3δ , 4δ , and 5δ > 0. The 
effect of technology on unemployment is uncertain, depending on the relative effect of 
technological improvement on skilled workers versus that of less-skilled workers. Finally, 
economic growth and higher labor productivity lead to a lower unemployment rate. Thus, 8δ  
and 9δ < 0. 
 
 
4 Empirical Results 
The data of this study are based on the OECD Statistics, Eurostat, and the CEP-OECD 
Database for International Comparison in Europe (DICE) from 1985 to 2009, comprising 15 
OECD European Union countries as mentioned in the previous section. The first two columns 
of Table 1 show the structural-form estimation results and the last two columns report the 
reduced-form estimation results.3
 
  
 
 
                                                 
3 The final analysis dataset has 363 observations, different from the expected 375 observations, because there 
are missing values in the unemployment rates for Germany from 1985 to 1990, the Netherlands for 1986, and 
Switzerland from 1985 to 1989.  
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Table 1. Estimation results of the structural-form equations and 
reduced-form equations 
  
 Structural-form equations Reduced-form equations  
 Labor Supply Function (w) 
Labor Demand 
Function (u) 
Hourly Wage 
Rate (w) 
Unemployment 
Rate (u)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
u 0.326**     
 (0.039)     
w  -0.130    
  (0.606)    
LMR Measurements 
Union -0.065** 0.065* -0.040 0.071*  
 (0.027) (0.074) (0.109) (0.080)  
RR -0.146*** 0.015 -0.131*** 0.032  
 (0.000) (0.706) (0.000) (0.104)  
EPL 0.344 -0.510 0.315 -0.551  
 (0.485) (0.144) (0.495) (0.146)  
TAX -0.109*** 0.081** -0.100*** 0.094***  
 (0.001) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000)  
Macroeconomic Shocks 
RD  1.510*** 0.894*** 1.394***  
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)  
TFP  0.745*** 0.526** 0.677***  
  (0.000) (0.029) (0.000)  
GR  -0.457*** -0.093 -0.446***  
  (0.000) (0.333) (0.000)  
Productivity  -0.165 -0.357* -0.119  
  (0.246) (0.056) (0.359)  
Fertility 5.528***  5.828*** -0.760  
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.628)  
Time effect yes yes yes yes  
Fixed effect yes yes yes yes  
Test Statistics 
F test 70.13 4588.92 88.79 6.97  
(P-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Adjusted-R 0.8882 0.4464 0.9181 0.4335  
Over-I.D. test passed exactly identified    
Weak I.D. test (F) 13.378 33.41    
Observations 363 363 363 363  
Note: 1. P-value are in parentheses. Constant terms are not reported. 
2. ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level.  
3. The above estimates are obtained by STATA command xtivreg2, which allows for heteroscedastic 
adjustment. We also apply GMM estimates to correct for possible endogeneity. 
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4.1 Estimation Results - Structural-form 
As far as the institutional effects on labor supply are concerned, we first note that three 
out of four coefficient estimates related to LMR ( 2γ , 3γ , 4γ , and 5γ ) are negative with 
statistical significance at the 5% level, which are consistent with theoretical expectations. The 
significant LMR variables are Union, RR, and TAX. Specifically, a 10% decrease in Union 
density increases the wage by 0.65%. Hence, the de-unionization observed in the past twenty 
years has weakened workers’ bargaining power in defending their rights, discouraged labor 
supply, shifted the labor supply curve leftward, and raised wage payments. Similarly, a 10% 
decrease in replacement rate RR increases the wage rate by 1.46% with the same changes in 
TAX generating a 1.09% increase in wage payments. These findings mean that decreases in 
labor market regulations have discouraged workers from joining the labor market due to a 
worse work environment.   
Several findings emerge from the estimation of the labor demand equation (see Column 
(2)). For labor market institutional effects, most coefficient estimates on the LMR measures 
are positive and consistent with theoretical expectations with two out of the four variables 
showing statistical significance: union density and tax wedge. Specifically, a 10% decrease in 
union density accounts for a 0.65% decrease in the unemployment rate. Similarly, a 10% 
reduction in tax wedge generates a 0.81% decline in the unemployment rate. The findings 
imply that more flexible labor market institutions enhance labor demand and alleviate the 
unemployment problem. This result echoes the existing empirical studies related to the 
reduced-form analysis on the unemployment rate (e.g., Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005). 
However, coefficient estimates on RR and EPL show no statistical significance in the 
estimation of the labor demand equation and that of EPL is inconsistent with expectation.   
A lower fertility rate shifts labor supply rightward, other things being constant, and 
decreases wage payments. The weak instrumental variable test, indicating a rejection with the 
F-statistic being 13.378, means that the instrument Fertility is appropriately selected. For 
technological shocks, a 1% increase in RD and TFP generates as high as approximately 
1.51% and 0.745% increases in the unemployment rate, respectively. The results reveal that 
the decreasing demand for unskilled labor outweighs the increasing demand for skilled labor. 
These findings reinforce the theoretical predictions by Acemoglu (1998), Machin and Van 
Reenen (1998), Van Reenen (2011), and Moore and Ranjan (2005) in that skill-biased 
technological changes decrease demand for less-skilled workers, but increase demand for 
skilled workers. The coefficient estimates of the other two macroeconomic shift variables GR 
and Productivity are also consistent with theoretical expectation with GR showing statistical 
significance. The weak instrumental variable test is also rejected in the labor demand 
equation with the F-statistic as large as 33.41. Moreover, the overidentification test is passed. 
 
4.2 Estimation Results - Reduced-form 
Turning to the reduced-form estimation results (Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1), we find 
that among the four measures for LMR, Union, RR, and TAX are the most important in 
determining wage payment and the unemployment rate. Furthermore, RR and TAX have a 
negative effect on the wage rate, while Union and TAX have a positive impact on the 
unemployment rate. Thus, a decrease in LMR induced by lower Union, RR, and TAX boosts 
the wage rate and undermines the unemployment rate. This indicates that after a series of 
interaction between labor supply and demand, the increments of labor demand, caused by 
more flexible labor market institutions, outweigh the reductions in labor supply. The finding 
regarding the mitigation of the unemployment rate echoes related studies on the reduced-form 
estimation model of the unemployment rate in the literature, such as Nickell (1997, 1998, and 
2003), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), and Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005).  
Another important finding is that various LMR reforms have different impacts on the 
market players. Hence, the overall results of LMR hinge primarily on how the reforms alter 
the decisions of both labor demand and labor supply. Based on the opposite effect on demand 
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and supply in the structural-form estimation results, the effect of de-unionization is cancelled 
out in equilibrium, leading to an insignificant overall effect in the reduced-form estimation. 
By contrast, certain reforms affect merely one side of the players in the labor market, leaving 
the other side unchanged, such as an alternation in the replacement rate. The story from 
simultaneous equations reveals that it is plausible for policymakers to identify the type of 
reforms that could alleviate the unemployment problem and increase worker wage payments. 
These findings lead us to conclude that when adopting LMR reforms, European governments 
should consider not only the different responses of market players, but also the tradeoffs 
between labor supply and demand. Via detailed investigations into all the responses of the 
market players, policymakers can now figure out an efficient method to redesign their labor 
market legislations so as to achieve the aim of a lower unemployment rate and higher wage 
payments without discouraging much of the labor force participation. 
A rather less important finding, but worth mentioning, is that macroeconomic variables 
have large estimates with high significance. We find that technological shocks push up the 
wage rate, but exacerbate the unemployment problem. Specifically, enhancements in RD and 
TFP tend to increase wage payments with TFP significantly pushing up the average 
unemployment rate. As such, a rapid improvement in technologies observed in many 
European countries in the past two decades could be one of the driving forces for the 
deterioration in wage inequality. Technological improvement also leads to a high 
unemployment rate, which is a finding that echoes related reduced-form studies on 
unemployment (e.g., Berman et al., 1998; Moore and Ranjan, 2005; Acemoglu and Autor, 
2011).   
 
5 Conclusion 
Labor market reforms have alleviated the unemployment problem in Europe. Through 
our empirical investigation, we find that certain kinds of labor market reforms have 
discouraged labor supply, such as the decline in union density, the replacement rate and tax 
wedge. At the same time, labor market flexibility due to lower union density and a reduction 
in tax wedge significantly enhances labor demand. In equilibrium, the degree of labor market 
rigidity is negatively correlated with wage payments, but positively related to the 
unemployment rate. As such, when adopting LMR reforms, it is very important for European 
governments to carefully investigate the responses of all the market players so as to figure out 
the most efficient method for lowering the unemployment rate, increasing wage payments, 
and not discouraging much labor supply in the economy. Our empirical results also indicate 
that the replacement rate is the only measure of LMR that affects labor supply, but not the 
demand side. Hence, when adopting labor market reforms, particular attention must be paid to 
the adjustment of the replacement rate in order to avoid overly depressing labor supply. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics 
Definitions Variable # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Data Source 
u Unemployment rate (%) 363 7.729 4.146 1.600 23.900 OECD statistics 
w Hourly direct pay (USD) 363 15.836 7.249 1.340 40.740 KILM dataset 
Union Union density (%) 363 41.191 22.040 7.576 83.890 OECD statistics 
RR Replacement rate (%) 363 34.326 10.671 0.350 64.940 OECD statistics 
EPL 
Employment protection 
legislation (score from 1-6) 
with 6 being the most 
protected level. 
363 2.341 0.898 0.600 4.190 OECD statistics 
TAX Tax wedge (%) 363 36.273 5.991 10.600 48.400 DICE CEP 
RD Gross domestic expenditure 
on R&D % of GDP (%) 
363 1.865 0.674 0.410 4.130 Eurostat 
TFP Total factor productivity 
growth rate (%) 
363 1.030 1.488 -7.600 7.100 OECD statistics 
GR GDP growth rate (%) 363 2.323 2.417 -8.227 10.917 OECD statistics 
Productivity Labor productivity growth 
rate (%) 
363 1.734 1.798 -8.800 10.000 OECD statistics 
Fertility Fertility rate (births per 
woman) 
363 1.631 0.243 1.150 2.500 WDI 
 
